学术论文

      欺压与风险分担:B2B电子交易市场环境下均衡策略分析

      Bully and risk sharing: Analysis on equilibrium strategies with B2B online exchange

      摘要:
      B2B电子交易市场为生产商和零售商提供了新的销售和采购渠道,从而改变了传统供应链结构.在考虑了随机需求和随机电子市场交易价格的基础上,文章研究了在B2B电子交易市场环境下单一生产商和单一零售商组成供应链的最优策略.在销售期之前,生产商首先决定批发价格和生产数量;作为跟随者,零售商决定零售价格和订购数量.在销售期,生产商和零售商可以在B2B电子交易市场中交易.研究结果表明,对于零售商,B2B电子交易市场可以作为投机市场或者第二采购渠道,而生产商在定价策略中通过欺压目的或者风险分担目的来进行风险管理.
      Abstract:
      The emergence of B2B online exchanges has provided manufacturers and retailers a new avenue to do their business,and thus has changed supply chain structures.This paper investigates the strategies of a manufacturer and a retailer in a decentralized supply chain with a fully liquid B2B online exchange.The man-ufacturer,as a Stackelberg leader,determines the wholesale price and the production output;while the retailer,as a follower,determines the retail price and the quantity to be ordered from the supplier prior to the selling season.During the selling season,both the manufacturer and the retailer can trade in the B2B online exchange.Our study shows that for the retailer,the B2B electronic market can serves as a speculation market or a second procurement source.Correspondingly,by using the pricing strategy,the manufacturer can achieve bully or risk-sharing intentions.
      作者: 邢伟 [1] 汪寿阳 [2] 冯耕中 [3]
      Author: XING Wei [1] WANG Shou-yang [2] FENG Geng-zhong [3]
      作者单位: 曲阜师范大学运筹与管理学院,日照,276826 中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院,北京,100080 西安交通大学管理学院,西安,710049
      刊 名: 管理科学学报 ISTICPKUCSSCI
      年,卷(期): 2010, 13(1)
      分类号: F253.2
      机标分类号: TP3 TN0
      在线出版日期: 2010年4月19日
      基金项目: 国家自然科学基金,国家自然科学基金重点项目